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Introduction  
  
For the most part psychology is disembodied, the processes and mechanisms it proposes as 
capable of being enabled by silicon and wire as by flesh and blood. This disembodiment 
means that analyses tend to grant unwarranted primacy to the cognitive realm, the realm of 
conscious thought and discourse. As a result, much of psychology lends itself to idealism, 
voluntarism and a notion of the subject as more-or-less transcendent, bounded, insightful, 
consistent and controlling. By contrast, in sociology, social theory, anthropology and other 
social sciences there has in recent years been a renewed interest in notions of embodiment, 
an interest that may currently be mutating into a focus on affect, emotion and feeling. These 
are topics on which neuroscience has much to say – indeed, the subdiscipline of affective 
neuroscience is concerned primarily with these aspects of our experience.   
  
Neuroscience today is not what it was when we were undergraduates. Its findings can no 
longer be so readily dismissed as speculative, or criticised as crassly reductive or naively 
deterministic, and nor can they necessarily be characterised as simply reactionary in their 
implications. Indeed, neuroscientific evidence is now accumulating that the fine structure of 
the brain is plastic and capable of being molded by experience, habit, repetition and activity. 
For example, one well known study showed that the brains of London taxi drivers had 
significantly larger hippocampi than those of controls (Maguire, Gadian et al. 2000). The 
hippocampus is associated with memory, including spatial memory, and extensive memory 
and learning are needed to learn how to navigate the streets of London. This learning is 
assessed by a test called ‘the knowledge’ which licensed drivers are required to take. The 
study not only showed that the taxi drivers’ hippocampi were larger than those of controls, 
they also demonstrated a dose-response relationship between hippocampal size and years 
spent taxi-driving. This suggests that the taxi-driving caused the increased hippocampal 
volume, rather than this brain feature being a predisposing feature for people to become taxi 
drivers. Other imaging studies have shown that learning to play the piano rapidly causes 
changes to the connections between auditory and motor cortices (Bangert and Altenmueller 
2003), and that just 12 weeks of cognitive therapy causes significant changes to patterns of 
brain activation (Wykes and Brammer 2002). And similarly at the level of brain chemistry, 
work with animals has shown that changes in social status impact causally on levels of the 
neurotransmitter serotonin (Raleigh, McGuire et al. 1984), and that stressful situations 
increase the availability of dopamine (Weiss, Glazer, & Pohoresky, 1976). The social 
significance of these findings is that serotonin may be implicated in diagnoses of 
‘depression’, and dopamine in diagnoses of ‘schizophrenia’.   
   
In short, such studies are showing that the brain itself is socialised. Of course, this is not 
how neuroscientists themselves typically speak of their findings, even within the emergent 
discipline of social neuroscience (e.g. Cacioppo and Berntson 2005). Nevertheless, evidence 
that the brain is socialised may provide new opportunities for social scientists to engage 
critically with reductionist, individualising tendencies within psychology, to formulate ways 
of thinking that undercut the troubling dualisms that structure psychological knowledge, and 
to ground social science thinking about the body and subjectivity in a valid empirical base.  
  
However, the kind of integration of social science and neuroscience which this work will 
demand is fraught with problems. In what follows I will first set out some of the potentials 
of any such integration, and then discuss some of the difficulties and problems with which it 
may be associated. Throughout, I will take Damasio’s work, and in particular his three 
books, as my primary focus. Damasio is an influential popular scientist, one of the best 
known neuroscientists to come to wider attention during the 1990’s “decade of the brain”. 
Although he publishes widely in neuroscience journals, Damasio’s books are relatively 
accessible and he is not frightened of theorising, a characteristic which may allow non-
specialists to better appreciate the import of his work. For these reasons he is perhaps the 
most ‘social science friendly’ of the major neuroscientists currently writing: consequently, 
problems encountered by social scientists trying to use his work may be indicative of those 
likely to arise when any neuroscientists’ work is used.  
  
Potentials  
  
Damasio’s first book is “Descartes Error” (1994). This book sets out his somatic marker 
hypothesis: that learned body state profiles associated with prior experience get reactivated 
on future occasions when we consider options. They provide valences that quickly rule some 
options out and others in, so that ‘rational’ decision making then occurs for the smaller set of 
remaining options. These body state profiles or somatic markers are the neural mechanism 
that produces “gut feelings” and intuition, and they may also operate outside of conscious 
awareness to produce biases that we only notice retrospectively, if at all. They are, in short, a 
means whereby affective and somatic responses get socialised and may feed forward into 
future activity.  
  
Despite the concerns of some commentators, it must be emphasised that this is not merely 
revived behaviourism. Somatic markers have a probabilistic effect, not a deterministic one: 
we can ignore them, we just have to “talk ourselves” into doing so. They are the product of 
social conventions and ethical rules not an asocial environment, so their influence is 
normative rather than mechanistic. Moreover, somatic markers operate through subjectivity, 
which therefore retains a central role, rather than being relegated to the status of 
epiphenomena as it is in behaviourism.  
  
The somatic marker hypothesis places the socialised, enculturated body at the core of 
decision-making, and in this way subverts the disembodied rationalism of mainstream 
psychology. It endows decision making with biases derived from previous experience, and 
so challenges the presumed rationality and coherence of the subject. In describing a pathway 
by which the ways we experience and feel our bodies is open to socialisation, it may also 
help us to understand how social class (Bourdieu 1977) and gender (Young 1990) come to 
be both profoundly embodied and phenomenologically experienced.  
  
Damasio’s second book “The Feeling of What Happens” (1999) sets out a theory of 
consciousness which focuses on how the body-brain system generates knowledge of world 
and organism at one and the same time, to produce a ‘self in the act of knowing’. In this 
book Damasio differentiates between two forms of consciousness which we typically 
experience as a seamless whole. Core consciousness is enabled by systems rising from the 
brainstem, and consists of second-order maps of changes in the brain-body system.  
Anything impinging upon the body-brain, whether externally or internally, produces a 
change in these systems and in so doing generates a “pulse” of core consciousness. The 
contents of any one of these pulses is the difference between the organism first in one state, 
and then in another. Core consciousness consists of a flow of such pulses, and in normal 
circumstances is ceaseless during waking hours.  
  
Core consciousness arises in evolutionarily old parts of the brain. As events registered there 
activate the higher cortices in networks of spreading neural activation they produce extended 
consciousness. Extended consciousness uses the capacity for memory, symbolic and 
linguistic representation to interpret, situate and understand, in fully human ways, the 
significance of events first registered in core consciousness.  
  
However, consciousness is much more complicated than this brief description suggests, 
since it is also constituted both by other brain systems and through the operation of multiple 
feedback loops. For example, the meanings in extended consciousness are subtended by 
neural events that are themselves changes in the brain-body system and hence can generate 
new pulses of core consciousness. Thus in our lived experience there is a dialectical, fluid 
relationship between core consciousness and extended consciousness: through their 
transactional operation the social and the embodied become thoroughly intertwined and, 
together, provide the basis of our being and knowing.  
  
Damasio’s third book is called “Looking for Spinoza” (2003). In many ways the least 
substantial and useful of the three books, this work attempts to set out the role of feelings in 
everyday life. Damasio identifies some of the major brain systems involved in the generation 
of feelings, and shows their centrality to our experience. More problematically in this book 
he also attempt some social theorising: we will return to this later.  
  
Problems  
  
Before looking at the difficulties for social scientists of using Damasio’s work, it should be 
acknowledged that within neuroscience itself there are both critiques of and alternatives to 
his position. For example, Panksepp (2004) described Damasio’s theory of emotion as a 
cognitive one, for its emphasis on brain areas such as the prefrontal and cingulate cortices; 
for Panksepp, emotion proper is generated by systems arising from the brainstem and the 
limbic area (Panksepp 1998). Rolls (1999) is critical of Damasio’s theory of how emotion 
and feeling play a part in decision-making, on the grounds that including the body in a 
feedback loop is simply too slow and hence, evolutionarily, unlikely to have arisen. 
Cognitivist alternatives reinstate cognition and rationality as the core constituents of human 
mental functioning, minimising the strong contributory role that Damasio gives to emotion 
and feeling and largely relegating them to the effects of evaluations (Lambie and Marcel 
2002). There are echoes here of the Zajonc-Lazarus debate concerning the possibility of 
affect-laden evaluations preceding, or occurring independently of, cognitive processing 
(Zajonc 1980; Lazarus 1982; Zajonc 1984). Some of this dispute now appears to have been 
largely semantic (to do with broader or narrower definitions of cognition), and some may 
have arisen as a consequence of the existence of both ‘high’ and ‘low’ roads for the 
generation of emotion in the mammalian brain (Le Doux 1999), a fact which may explain 
why there is empirical evidence in support of both positions. It is unclear for the moment 
whether the distance between current cognitivist positions and Damasio’s stance can be 
similarly reduced. Leaving these issues aside, however, there are problems specifically for 
social scientists who wish to engage constructively with Damasio’s work.  
  
Conceptual issues  
  
The first set of problems are described by Bennett and Hacker (2003). Bennet is a 
neuroscientist and Hacker a philosopher: together, they draw upon the later philosophy of 
Wittgenstein to analyse and critique the work of many contemporary neuroscientists, 
including Damasio. Mereology is the study of part-whole relationships, and central to their 
arguments is what they call the ‘mereological fallacy’: their term for a tendency amongst 
neuroscientists to ascribe psychological predicates, attributes, activities and characteristics to 
the brain. They provide detailed evidence and examples to illustrate their contention that 
neuroscientists frequently attribute to the brain psychological characteristics (such as 
believing, interpreting and guessing) which, logically, can only be attributed to persons - of 
whom the brain is but a part. As they put it:  
  
“It is not that as a matter of fact brains do not think, hypothesise and decide, see and 
hear, ask and answer questions; rather, it makes no sense to ascribe such predicates 
or their negations to the brain. The brain neither sees, nor is it blind – just as sticks 
and stones are not awake, but they are not asleep either. The brain does not hear, but 
it is not deaf, any more than trees are deaf. The brain makes no decisions, but nor is it 
indecisive. Only what can decide can be indecisive. So, too, the brain cannot be 
conscious; only the living creature whose brain it is can be conscious – or 
unconscious. The brain is not a logically appropriate subject for psychological 
predicates”  
(Bennett and Hacker 2003 p. 72, emphases in original).  
  
Bennet and Hacker suggest that this tendency is a ‘mutant’ or ‘degenerate’ form of Cartesian 
dualism. Cartesian thinking applied psychological predicates to the mind, and only 
derivatively to the human being: current neuroscience simply applies them to the brain 
instead. It is important to realise that their critique is not an empirical one: because the 
activities and functions that they list are attributes of organisms, and not of the organs of 
which they are constituted, no amount of empirical evidence concerning the brain 
mechanisms that enable them is likely to overcome the objections they raise. The error is a 
logical or conceptual one, and so empirical research cannot resolve it: what is needed instead 
is a different way of interpreting and situating empirical research.  
  
The mereological fallacy within neuroscience may cause problems for constructive 
integration with social science because it introduces forms of dualism, reification, and 
biological reductionism. By treating the brain as though it has psychological characteristics, 
it seems at first glance that mind-body dualism is removed. But this appearance is merely 
superficial (as the continuing relevance of the ‘hard problem’ in fact illustrates). In fact, this 
move simply pushes the problem of mind-body dualism ‘inside’ the brain, translating it into 
something that arises at the level of neurones and synapses, rather than at the level of minds 
and their corresponding bodies. Not only is dualism thereby reinstated; at the same time, its 
basis is moved deep inside the organism, making social science contributions appear less 
relevant.  
  
Reification becomes an issue because we humans use our bodies and material resources to 
organise, arrange and conduct our activities in social and collective ways. We have evolved 
shared traditions of symbolic representation and tool use, and ritualised practices which 
organise the activities vital for our own reproduction, survival and wellbeing. Because the 
entire body and its capacities are central to our understandings of these social and material 
practices, equating the brain with the organism mystifies or negates social scientific 
understandings of these dimensions of human life. Whilst the brain is clearly a critical organ 
in their conduct, treating it as their sole instigator and vehicle may lead to their reification – 
either as disembodied, cognitive processes, or alternatively as neural capabilities or synaptic 
events.  
  
Equating the brain with the organism is also, most obviously, a form of reductionism. It 
minimises important qualitative distinctions between different kinds of brains (rats and 
humans, for example) and makes it easier to imagine that our analytical focus should be 
upon the biological, rather than also being concerned with social and material space and 
time. It tends to produce a relatively exclusive focus on events at the level of brain region, 
synapse or neurone, as though the brain were not already a collection of massively open 
systems thoroughly imprinted with the character of our social relations.  
  
Bennett and Hacker make numerous specific points concerning the ways in which the 
mereological fallacy plays itself out in Damasio’s conception of emotion, arguing that 
emotions need not be caused by mental images, are not about somatic changes, and are 
independent of cognitive knowledge concerning causation. They also suggest that his 
somatic marker hypothesis is ‘misconceived’ because events in the world (an injustice, for 
example) rather than feelings are the source of our judgements concerning good and evil 
(see Bennet and Hacker 2003, p.213-216). Whilst some of their objections can be refuted as 
either based upon partial readings or presupposing some kind of linguistic dominance (a 
tendency to which Wittgenstein’s ideas are suited –  see Parker 1996), others are more 
telling. In particular, they challenge Damasio’s claim that feelings are the first-person 
experience of somatic changes, whose meaning derives from their bodily character. From 
their Wittgensteinian position, the sources of experience are not within us, in some veiled 
inner life, but publicly available in the shared social world. Emotions and feelings are public 
events, called out in social interactions within which they are dynamic, variable, and 
constitutive of the ongoing trajectories that emerge. Consequently, their meaning and 
character is derived from this ongoing social situation, and not from their somatic character: 
“What makes the blushes blushes of shame rather than of embarrassment or of love, is not 
the ‘thought’ or mental image, if any, that accompanies them, but the circumstances and the 
object of the emotion” (Bennett and Hacker 2003 p.213, emphasis in original)  
  
  
Political issues  
  
A second set of problems with regard to the constructive use of Damasio’s work are more 
explicitly political. Van Ommen (2005) observed that Damasio fails to recognise dimensions 
of social class that are present and significant in some of the literature that he cites. For 
example, with respect to a description of Netherlands politics in the 17th century he says that 
senior government positions could be held by an “intelligent commoner”, suggesting 
agreement with a stereotype of “commoners” as generally unintelligent. And when Damasio 
engages with culture it is generally high culture that he cites – for example opera, classical 
music and the paintings of Rembrandt – examples suggestive of a leaning towards a 
particular elitist strand of culture.  Moreover, throughout Damasio’s third book the 
normativity of the profit motive and a fundamentally capitalist form of liberal democracy 
appears to be taken for granted, almost naturalised. Damasio’s apparent acceptance of 
capitalist economics appears wholly consistent with his own strategy of self-marketing. He 
is, it seems, self-consciously striving to be a ‘superstar’ neuroscientist in the mold of, say, 
Oliver Sacks. Damasio has an agent, and charges substantial fees for speaking engagements; 
photographs of him are carefully posed, they are copyrighted, and their use is controlled.  
  
Damasio also seems to accept relatively uncritically the framework of ‘psychopathology’ 
promoted by the APA’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM), despite the known 
problems of over-inclusiveness, validity and reliability associated with it. In fact, by taking 
this framework as given Damasio appears to tie himself in a knot by hypothesising that the 
callous disregard for others that a diagnosis of ‘psychopathy’ typifies might be the outcome 
of an inability to form somatic markers. The problem for Damasio is that such people are 
typically described as charming or even charismatic, and are clearly highly socially skilled, 
whereas people unable to form somatic markers are said to be deficient at social interaction. 
An alternative explanation would be that, rather than having some kind of organic brain 
injury, people receiving this diagnosis have been enculturated in ways that mean selfish 
disregard for others is ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ for them. Such an explanation could even draw 
upon Damasio’s own hypothesis, and associate it with the strong epidemiological 
relationship between forms of psychopathology and abusive upbringings of various kinds 
(Read, van Os et al. 2005), yet Damasio’s acceptance of the integrity of the DSM categories 
seems to have blinded him to this interesting possibility.  
  
Related to this issue, evolutionary psychology is endorsed at numerous points in Damasio’s 
writings. The problem here is not with attempts to include an evolutionary perspective in the 
widest sense, since sometimes this is clearly appropriate. Rather, the problem is with 
Damasio’s apparent readiness to accept as ‘true’ the flimsy, ideologically convenient “just so 
stories” propagated by those who seek to explain significant parts of contemporary human 
behaviour with primary reference to our ancestors who lived in caves or on the savannah 
(Rose and Rose 2001). This problem is particularly troubling since Damasio often invokes 
evolutionary psychology as a possible explanatory mode at precisely those points when a 
societal explanation, derived from social theory and empirical evidence, would be 
appropriate.  
  
The problems associated with Damasio’s own political proclivities become most apparent in 
this third book, “Looking for Spinoza”, where he attempts to make links between the brain 
and social structures. His efforts are rooted in a relatively individualist reading of Spinoza 
which simplistically equates ethical behaviour with self-interest, and for the most part he 
attempts to simply infer the social from the biological, using the notion of ‘homeostasis’ as a 
bridging concept. Again, the problem is not that he attempts to integrate the social and the 
biological but rather the way in which he does so, which simply gives primacy to the 
biological rather than recognising mutual interdependence and influence. In this book 
Damasio infers the social from the biological without any proper recognition that, over time, 
the social becomes embodied, and that this occurs in both ontogenetic and phylogenetic 
senses. His neologism “social homeostasis” may be particularly revealing in this regard, 
since elsewhere in his writings he recognises the conceptual inadequacy of the term 
“homeostasis” (because the biologial equilibria it references are typically dynamic rather 
than static). As a consequence, elsewhere in his writings he favours the term 
“homeodynamics”, so it is perhaps significant that when he exports this concept to the social 
realm he reverts to “homeostasis”, with its implications of stability, fixedness, and the 
maintenance of an immutable status quo.  
  
The introduction of the concept of social homeostasis accompanies a description of social 
life as homeostatically regulated by institutions of governance in the broadest sense (i.e. 
government, laws, judiciary and legislature, as well as religious and other organisations) 
where it is stated that the “ultimate goal of these institutions revolves around promoting life 
and avoiding death and enhancing well-being and reducing suffering” (Damasio 2003 
p.167)”. Whilst it cannot be denied that for a minority at least these institutions do serve 
these functions, and whilst the officers of these institutions might even agree with Damasio’s 
description of their ultimate goal, it is also true that most of these institutions also have as 
their goal the preservation and furtherance of capitalism and its associated social systems. 
Consequently, what life and wellbeing they do promote is necessarily unevenly distributed, 
and always dependent upon competition, exploitation, colonisation and the forcible 
maintenance of inequitable power structures and systems of social inequality.  
  
Conclusion  
  
Despite these conceptual and political problems, and perhaps despite his own leanings and 
tendencies, Damasio has nevertheless written an account of how social influence becomes an 
integral part of the body/brain and feeds forward into individual activity through the 
deployment and constitution of states of embodiment. In this sense he has, seemingly 
accidentally, laid the foundations for a bridge between neuroscience and those branches of 
social theory that address the social body in its fleshy actuality –for example the works of 
Norbert Elias, Pierre Bourdieu and Iris Marion Young (Cromby 2005). There are also 
associations between his work and the emergent field of neuropsychoanalysis (Solms & 
Turnbull, 2002) which, like other branches of psychoanalysis, might have the potential to 
inform and contribute to social and political critiques. Hence, and possibly despite himself, 
Damasio’s work may provide part of the basis for new ways of thinking about subjectivity 
that intertwine the social, the phenomenological and the biological in ways that make 
redundant the tired dualisms of the past.  
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